A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing

A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing

Abstract

We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mech- anism decides a set of players that are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to pay. We determine three conditions: Fence Monotonicity, Stability of the allocation and Validity of the tie-breaking rule that are necessary and sufficient for group-strategyproofness, regardless of the cost function. Consequently, Fence Monotonicity characterizes group-strategyproof cost-sharing schemes closing an important open problem. Finally, we use our results to prove that there exist families of cost functions, where any group-strategyproof mechanism has arbitrarily poor budget balance.

Grafik Top
Authors
  • Pountourakis, Emmanouil
  • Vidali, Angelina
Grafik Top
Shortfacts
Category
Journal Paper
Divisions
Theory and Applications of Algorithms
Journal or Publication Title
Algorithmica
Publisher
Springer
Place of Publication
Heidelberg
Number
4
Volume
63
Date
2012
Export
Grafik Top